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Streaming subjectivation: 
Two questions and one thesis about netflix
Andityas Soares De Moura Costa Matos
This paper aims to investigate – shortly – the sub-
jectivation process that emerges from Netflix, here 
understood as a spectacular apparatus that articu-
lates, in a very specific way, the category of “sub-
ject”. For this purpose, it uses ideas of authors 
such as Giorgio Agamben, Roberto Esposito, 
Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri and Gilles Deleuze. 
The paper initially delineates a brief theoretical 
introduction to problems regarding subjectivation 
and desubjectivation in the post-modernity, espe-
cially considering the role played by the new tech-
nologies and the new media. Then, it presents two 
questions about Netflix and its relationship with 
the guilt, the common and the spectacle. The paper 
concludes with one thesis: Netflix is a new expres-
sion of political theology, since it works dividing 
and unifying the reality, like the disjunctive synthe-
sis thought by Deleuze. Finally, the text indicates 
some quick hypothesis that point to a new use – 
profanatory and careless – of Netflix. 
NETFLIX SUBJECTIVATION GUILT
DISJUNCTIVE SYNTHESIS POLITICAL THEOLOGY
* This paper was developed in the context of the Research Project Desobediência civil e democracia: a parti-
cipação cidadã não-violenta como estratégia de luta por direitos em contextos de exceção econômica perma-
nente (Civil disobedience and democracy: the citizen participation as a strategy of fighting for rights in con-
texts of permanent economic exception) sponsored by FAPEMIG (Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado 
de Minas Gerais) and of the Research Project Desobediência civil como prática constituinte e interpretação 
popular da Constituição: fundamentação jurídico-filosófica para estratégias não violentas de luta por direi-
tos em contextos de estado de exceção econômico (Civil disobedience as constitutive practice and popu-
lar interpretation of Constitution: juridical-philosophical principles to non-violent strategies of fighting for ri-
ghts in contexts of economic state of exception), which has been developed in IEAT’s Resident Professor 
Program (Institute of Advanced Transdisciplinary Studies of Minas Gerais Federal University, Brazil).
*
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Only the child and the animal are innocent (unschuldig); the man must have 
guilt (muss Schuld haben).
G.W.F. Hegel
Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Weltgeschichte
Introduction
Netflix is nowadays the major streaming service on the planet with more than 
100 million of subscribers. The company was originally established in 1997 as 
a DVD delivery service through mail, currently offering its streaming services 
worldwide (190 countries), except from China, North Korea, Crimea, and Syria. In 
2016, its revenue was US$8.83bi, profiting US$380mi in the same year. However, 
more than these impressive numbers, the most important aspect regarding 
Netflix is its capacity to establish a new way for people to relate to the media, 
to the world and to themselves, thereby becoming a powerful apparatus of (de)
subjectivation.
In this regard, the paper intends to investigate the modes of (de)sub-
jectivation that this apparatus utilizes, also indicating alternatives to its destitu-
tion and profanation, in the sense that Giorgio Agamben applies to these terms:
And if “to consecrate” (sacrare) was the term that indicated the removal of things from 
the sphere of human law, “to profane” meant, conversely, to return them to the free use 
of men. The great jurist Trebatius thus wrote, “In the strict sense, profane is the term for 
something that was once sacred or religious and is returned to the use and property of 
men”. And “pure” was the place that was no longer allotted to the gods of the dead and 
was now “neither sacred, nor holy nor religious, freed from all names of this sort, means 
of profanation”. The thing that is returned to the common use of men is pure, profane, 
free of sacred names. But use does not appear here as something natural: rather, one ar-
rives at it only by means of profanation (Agamben 2007, 73-74).
For this purpose, we will discuss two questions related to the specific function-
ing of Netflix (section 2), which will point to a proposal, with a philosophical 
character, regarding what Netflix does actually represent in the contempora-
neity (section 3). Nevertheless, before we proceed to the critical-philosophical 
study of Netflix, we need to delineate a brief theoretical introduction to the ep-
ochal context in which it is located (section 1), bearing in mind some problems 
regarding subjectivation and desubjectivation in the post-modernity, especial-
ly considering the role played by the new technologies and the new media that 
characterize this scenario.
I. (De)subjectivation, technotopia and contemporaneity
The power and the extent of the current (de)subjectivation processes are re-
vealed when we consider its maximization through contemporary technology 
and technique, which promise to offer to society instruments of immediate pre-
sentification (digital democracy or e-democracy) 1 or ways to popularize cultur-
al goods using internet, as in the case of Netflix. 
Nevertheless, it is necessary to carefully think about this frame. 
Without underestimating the libertarian potential of the communication and en-
tertainment technologies, we should recognize that they are responsible for the 
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most complete way of desubjectivation that has been worldly known, and this 
in a context of an extreme political-foundational gap, contributing to a radical 
disembodiment of the political power that we now support. Although the social 
network, the streaming services and the technologies associated to them can 
be used to convoke a popular assembly or to release a critical content film, they, 
mostly and in a long term, are used instead as structures that guarantee the re-
moval of the subjects from the social life.
This happens because these technological devices are not simple ap-
paratus that can eventually be turned against the power; by the contrary, they 
figure as a specific type of postmodern apparatus whose primary function is to 
desubjectify the subjects, rendering vain the justification that many of them use, 
according to which there would be correct and incorrect ways of using technol-
ogy. Only who has been captured can think that way and, as a necessary result 
of this process, they cannot perceive it. As Agamben argues: 
Here lies the vanity of the well-meaning discourse on technology, which asserts that the 
problem with apparatuses can be reduced to the question of their correct use. Those who 
make such claims seem to ignore a simple fact: If a certain process of subjectification (or, 
in this case, desubjectification) corresponds to every apparatus, then it is impossible for 
the subject of an apparatus to use it “in the right way”. Those who continue to promote 
similar arguments are, for their part, the product of the media apparatus in which they 
are captured (Agamben 2009, 21).
When networks and streaming services filter all social relations, the experience 
of life in society is impoverished and formalized, shared and/or reproduced to 
the same extent of its lack of realism. The gadgets – cell phone, tablets, com-
puters – that make possible the experience of Facebook or Netflix become thus 
the true gate to the law, never surmountable by its users, in the exact sense of 
Kafka’s terrible parable (Before the law). The users actually limit and value their 
experience based on the continuous insertions in the parallel universes to which 
they submit themselves, whether they called Facebook, Netflix, or any other one. 
The problem is that these universes do not communicate with the world of po-
litical action. This world, which is always conflicting, contradictory, and present, 
is replaced by another world in which new identities – intensively mediated – 
overlap with those that gave rise to them, settling a process that affects not only 
the political level of bourgeois-liberal representativeness, but also almost all the 
social dimensions.
The communicational logic is guided by the intense mediatic exposure, 
which, in turn, legitimizes itself through an even faster process of complete in-
sertion of the life on the internet, the only place for “action” recognized as legit-
imate and “real” by the users. The political action, aestheticized to the limit, be-
comes the exhaust valve for the guilt created by the omission, or even worse, 
turns itself into a privileged way of building mediatized identities that want to 
appear socially responsible and libertarian, but deep down, refuse to bodily par-
ticipate as living beings in the causes that they support, weakening and expos-
ing them to a process of emptying, typical of the tired post-modernity.
Without being able to revisit here all the profound criticism addressed 
to the problem of technique, especially the one peculiar to an important part of 
the German thought of the first half of the 20th century (Martin Heidegger, Ernst 
Jünger, Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer, Walter Benjamin etc.), it is necessary 
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to recognize that the belief in the libertarian possibilities of apparatuses such 
as the e-democracy, Facebook and Netflix are nothing more than a technotopia 
that ignores the basic warning addressed to the views that intend to depoliticize 
the men’s world based on the argument that technological innovation and the 
domain of digital machines/platforms would be neutral and, therefore, able to 
guarantee the collective wealth: any machine – as well as its effects and results, 
for example, Netflix – composes a concrete dimension of ideological superstruc-
ture. According to Charles Douglas Lummis, machines are human relationships 
materialized (Lummis 1996), which is the reason why they can never be neutral 
or apolitical; contrarily, they express certain socially determined and constitut-
ed desires and intentions in their own configuration. In the following sections (2 
and 3) we will specifically discuss the desires and intentions related to Netflix, as 
well as its fractures and contradictions. 
Each society produces the machines necessary to the maintenance 
of the original political decision that continually bases it. In a society in which 
the rational or dialectical mediation has become problematic – as presented by 
Carlo Galli in his significant book on Carl Schmitt (Galli 2010) – and which is 
based, thus, on the ideas of separate power, hierarchy and liberal representation, 
the belief in the magical powers of technology would be just another element 
for the strengthening of these limited notions of the political. The simple accept-
ance of the e-democracy’s procedures, with the popularization of the network 
and the machines that keep it active, does not in any way determine important 
political transformations, as the very core of what it consists – or what it can be 
(potentia) – the politics is not questioned and stressed, topic briefly discussed in 
the last section of this paper. 
According to the Invisible Committee, the technological paraphernalia 
that we enjoy today is only used to refuse, in a hallucinating way, our contact to 
the world, which maintains the crisis which is above all, before being ecological, 
political or economic, a crisis of presence. The separate power – the term is here 
used in the meaning applied by Guy Debord in the first and fundamental chap-
ter of The society of the spectacle – is only able to impose itself in front of a void, 
in an artificial absence that separates the living beings and the things, changing 
mutant subjectivities into fixed subjects. Therefore, it is necessary to the sepa-
rating and mediating power to deepen the absences while covering them. The 
smartphone is an essential instrument for this purpose, since, by apparently con-
centrating all the access to the world – it is in the same time a telephone, a com-
pass, a cinema, a place of erotic and/or family gatherings –, ends to function as a 
prosthesis that prevents any relation with the presence of persons or things, im-
posing a state of constant semi-presence to its users (The Invisible Committee 
2015), now completely subjectivated in the role of zombies that the technocratic 
postmodernity reserves to them. 
Two senior Google executives published an influential work in which 
they predict the imminent replacement of representative governments by the 
online direct participation of all citizens, thereby shaping a new, efficient, cre-
ative, and participatory digital democracy (Cohen & Schmidt 2014, 3), in which 
both Google and Netflix can participate as forums of ideological basis. All of this 
will only be possible, as said by the neoprophets, through the increasingly con-
scious use of an instrument that human beings have created and still do not un-
derstand very well: the internet, classified by the authors as the most important 
anarchic experiment of human history.
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 However, this prediction is no more than a lie. The digital democra-
cy dreamed up by the technophiles is impossible due to the same reasons that 
make it seem seductive. Instead of eliminating the government, the cybernet-
ics enables new types of separate governments, presenting them, however, as 
transparent and open to the participation of all. Rather than creating new sub-
jectivities, freer and more responsible, the apparatuses such as Netflix continu-
ally desubjectify and resubjectify whilst reactivating the ancestral mechanism 
of guilt, as it will be discussed in section 3.
The Invisible Committee is right in uncovering the decline of the old 
sovereignty centralized on the idea of individual subjectivities, process that 
gives way to an impersonal government in which the subject merely appears as 
part of a much larger structure, in which it is only important to forecast trends 
based on large amounts of statistical data – such as the big data –, essentials to 
the functioning of Netflix’s mechanism. In this context, the classic idea of “one 
man, one vote”, translated in the digital shape of the alleged e-democracy, re-
veals itself illusory and useless. In the cyber government, individuals and their 
rights to freedom, intimacy and election have no weight. It only matters that 
they continually feed the system with their data, improving the algorithms. This 
is the very essence of the apparatus like Netflix, which only works if people con-
stantly use it, refining and expanding their functions and codes.
Behind the magic promise of a digital democratic society sustained by 
individual subjects accessing their computers or smartphones to see Netflix or 
Facebook, there is a clear project of global control and management that disre-
gard them as living political beings, considering them merely points of network 
maintenance. If the old sovereignty produced subjects to establish a separation 
between who commands and who obeys, the new cybernetic science of gov-
ernment dissolves each and every subjectivity in the very lack of relation im-
posed on the subjects, who docilely share all of their data and experiences in 
an abstract community that no longer need to be governed, since it is by itself 
government in a pure state, self-vigilance and self-control beyond any panoptic: 
consummate separation, Guy Debord would say. It unites because it separates. 
It separates because it unites. Disjunctive synthesis. Like it occurs in Netflix, as it 
will be discussed in the following sections.
II. Two questions about Netflix
In this second section, we do not intend to technically analyze Netflix’s func-
tioning, but rather to explore the subjectivation process that occur in it through 
the discussion of two very specific aspects in its logic, to enlighten its totalizing 
meaning (which will be discussed in the third section).
The first question that seems essential to us is: Why some movies and 
TV shows constantly get in and get out of Netflix? 
What is at stake here is the old guilt mechanism, which keeps under 
disguise its irrevocable mutuality with capital. The movies and TV Shows offered 
by Netflix – whether produced by it or other media companies – are not owned 
by anyone who pays the 7,99€ to access it, becoming only objects of use, since it 
is possible for an user to simultaneously watch the same movie with many oth-
ers users, without the use of one limit the use of the other. This feature could 
deceive us by indicating the possibility of a common use. However, through a 
more carefully analysis, it demonstrates that it is the exact opposite. The movie 
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– take Star Wars V: The Empire Strikes Back as an example – does not become 
common just for being available in the Netflix catalog. On the contrary, its pri-
vate features are even more strengthened, since it continues to have an owner. 
Specifically in the case of productions that were not created by Netflix, which 
are the overwhelmingly majority of its catalog, the viewer has only a limited 
right of use, that lasts for a certain time and then it is vanished. 
This evinces the functioning of which Giorgio Agamben called unprofa-
nable. In his words:
If, as has been suggested, we use the term “spectacle” for the extreme phase of capital-
ism in which we are now living, in which everything is exhibited in its separation from 
itself, then spectacle and consumption are the two sides of a single impossibility of us-
ing. What cannot be used is, as such, given over to consumption or to spectacular exhi-
bition. This means that it has become impossible to profane (or at least that it requires 
special procedures). If to profane means to return to common use that which has been 
removed to the sphere of the sacred, the capitalist religion in its extreme phase aims at 
creating something absolutely unprofanable (Agamben 2007, 82).
Agamben and several others philosophers see in the use a mechanism capable 
of deactivating the right of property. However, the spectacle proves that even 
the use could be reversed and transformed into an apparatus of contemplative 
subjectivation, turning it against those who might become free from the capital. 
In this regard, the majority of movies and TV Shows shown on Netflix, since they 
belong to someone – in the example, to Disney – and, therefore, are not com-
mon, only offer an apparent and rigidly controlled use, which cannot be shared 
or profaned. We potentially challenge – what is a paradox – the property right 
when we have a DVD or even the file of a movie, which can be borrowed, upload-
ed, launched in the web, copied and so on. However, that becomes impossible 
when the radical loneliness of Netflix allows us only a private and limited use 
(controlled by login and password) of cultural goods marked unequivocally by 
the sign of property, more and more accumulating, more and more perfect in its 
perception that the use constitutes a dimension to be neutralized, so as to make 
it harmless, leading it to the juridical matrix of property in whose it appears just 
like another of its powers. In fact, say the lawyers, the owner can use, enjoy and 
dispose of his own property, thereby denying, by this acts, an ontological dignity 
to the use, one that could be potent enough to antagonize the owner apparatus. 
As I said before, another element that explains the change of many TV 
Shows and movies on Netflix is the guilt. By knowing that these goods will not be 
available forever – being, therefore, scarce in a radically new sense, which nev-
ertheless ceases to be a harbinger, in the manner proposed by the old political 
economy denounced by Marx –, the viewer feels obliged to use them as quickly 
as possible, in order to not lose the precious opportunity that is offered to him for 
a mere 7,99€ monthly. Furthermore, if we search for something on Netflix and we 
cannot find it, Netflix even informs us that what we are looking for was available 
at an uncertain moment, thus, throwing for us the burden of our absence in the 
right time and the right place, that is, in the limit, the wholeness of the life ex-
perience to be converted in time for spectacular devotion. The time for devotion 
is the access time. This not only refines the algorithm but also intends to keep a 
perpetual and desperate connection – we will never be able to watch everything 
we want –, an afflictive and productive relation – there is always more and more 
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and, if you have not watched what is no longer available, it is your fault. It reap-
pears here, therefore, with all its terrible morbidity, the Benjaminian figure of the 
capitalism as a religion without holydays or pauses, pointing to an experience of 
total subjectivation in which guilt is the product of a constant cult that never re-
deems (Benjamin 1991). Instead: it produces more guilt. 
The frequent change of movies and TV Shows on Netflix encapsulates 
the viewer, like the old Cartesian subject, which reemerges now as someone that 
watches, ergo exists; and produces an alienated subjectivity that, paradoxically, 
uses the competition with itself, betting how many hours per day someone can 
be plugged in this experimentum vitae completely unrelated to any notion of 
community, which appears only as an epiphenomenon of the algorithm, to indi-
cate those goods that are on “top” or are the “most popular” ones. If the sharing 
that social networks as Facebook require as a rule does not guarantee by itself 
any potentiality for the construction of the common, what about an apparatus 
like Netflix? It was designed and thought to ensure an individual and private 
experience, tailored to particular tastes of its users – “the strangest the better”, 
“European movies awarded in Cannes”, “Movies and TV Shows to young adults”, 
and so on –, all of them treated like pinpoints essences. However, if Netflix struc-
tures itself in order to offer an experimentation/production of the own privacy, 
then why does it not explore the more tempting and lucrative side of the spec-
tacular privacy? 
In other words, and that is the second question: Why is there not a 
section to porn movies on Netflix?
The question, clearly, has nothing to do with the others streaming porn 
services in the world, including the Brazilian Sexflix – threatening by Netflix to be 
prosecuted for irregular use of its name and image 1 
–, but to know why Netflix itself, the most powerful 
and influential visual media streaming service, does 
not have a section to porn movies (or even several 
sections, based on the preferences of the users), and 
still makes joke about this possibility. In fact, in April, 
1st, 2017, the proverbial liar’s day, Netflix launched 
two videos in which it promised to add “adult con-
tent” to its catalog. 2 In the first of them, we see a 
young housewife, barely naked, with a temper at 
same time imperious and languishing, opening the 
door to an electrician with a body equally Euclidian, 
suggesting to us that between them will begin soon the craziness of a spectac-
ular copula. However, the “adult content” is solved in a joke, i.e., in a “class” about 
how to change the resistance of the electric shower, something obviously re-
served for adults. The joke, nevertheless, is deeper than the end of the video in 
which the electrician, after replacing the resistance of the shower and actually 
taking a shower, says that he never takes more than five minutes. The video is 
developed with a strict obedience of all the canons and formal requirements of 
porn movies, as if Netflix wanted to tell us that it does not have a porn section 
because it simply does not want to, since it knows the arcanes not only of its re-
production, but, mainly, of its production. 
In this fact lays more than an obvious moralism, which does not make 
sense in our time, since, within four walls, the specific and “natural” locus of Netflix, 
in the despotic room of the oikos, even the fascists confess to be multicultural, 
1 http://www.diariodepernam-
buco.com.br/app/noticia/viv-
er/2017/05/04/internas_viver,702263/
brasileirinhas-lanca-sexf-
lix-com-filmes-pornos-e-e-no-
tificada-pela-n.shtml
2 http://cinepop.com.br/netf-
lix-anuncia-adicao-de-filmes-por-
no-em-seu-catalogo-141159
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tolerant and sexually liberated, as is the case of Alice Weidel, that is only con-
tradictory to a mind too embedded in the logic of the siècle XIX. Weidel, who is 
the leader of an extreme right party, Alternative for Germany (Alternative für 
Deutschland), that conquered, in the last parliamentary elections in September, 
13% of the votes and 98 chairs in the Bundestag, is assumed lesbian and married 
to a Sri Lanka immigrant, despite the defense by her party of the traditional fam-
ily (man-woman) and of the closing of the German borders for immigrants. Alice 
Weidel explains those paradoxes stating that, within the private space of her 
home – which, incidentally, is in Switzerland –, she can make choices that would 
be unacceptable in the public space. 3 
A small and surprisingly essay titled Idea 
del comunismo by Giorgio Agamben can help us to 
understand the goals of Netflix when it refuses to 
host porn movies. Although Agamben’s text is from 
the 80s and pornography has changed a lot since 
then, what we intend to discuss, in this paper, is not 
an archeology or sociology of pornography, but rather to bring it as an exem-
plary case able to illustrate the ambiguous relation between public and private 
in the context of (de)subjectivation mechanisms such as Netflix. In this regard, 
as Agamben affirms, the eternal political reason of pornography is to reveal the 
potential of happiness in the most insignificant situations of the everyday life 
and in every way of human sociability (Agamben 1985). Once again, the Italian 
author assumes an unique Benjaminian statement, according to which it is in 
the most ridiculed and despised ideas of a time that the utopian path to revolu-
tion can be found. In the first line of Agamben’s text, he says that the utopia of 
a classless society reveals itself in pornography. This is due, firstly, to the cari-
catured excess that marks the differences between the classes in porn movies, 
even in their clothes – the housewife and the electrician –, and then to the sexual 
relations that transfigure these differences, pointing to a world in which happi-
ness is always available, always at hand. 
It seems, therefore, that pornography deals with some potency to hap-
piness, to the meeting and to the common that in no way is close to the ap-
paratus of Netflix. Considering this idea, one could oppose that pornography is 
usually enjoyed alone, at home and as anonymously as possible, which reveals 
itself as a perfect profile to Netflix’s user. However, this thought is wrong, since 
in the spectacular world what matters is what is seen, not who sees; the self is 
reduced to a mere function of the image. And, in this regard, the pornographic 
images do not stop to promise us, repeatedly, an easy happiness, an effortless, 
endless and worthless happiness translated in the excess and the fading mate-
riality of perfect bodies always available. More than the loneliness of the viewer, 
the pornography itself – whether we like it or not, presents itself in silly, cruel or 
even exciting way – involves the idea of an endless community of desiring bod-
ies that cannot be simply exposed on Netflix under the heading of a new profile 
framer, next to “kids” profile, without putting at risk all the mechanism that re-
quires the reaffirmation of the home – and, for extension, of the family – as an 
opposite space to the public square, as wanted and practiced by Alice Weidel. 
Netflix is even more “post-modern” than Alice: it does not reaffirm the division 
between private and public, oikos and agora, reserving to each one distinct bi-
opolitical competences, but, instead, it turns the agora in a function of oikos, dis-
solving the public in a residue that so becomes incommunicable with the mere 
3 http://uk.businessinsider.
com/germany-afd-alice-wei-
del-everything-you-need-to-
know-2017-9/#this-is-38-year-
old-alice-weidel-the-co-leader-
of-germanys-far-right-alterna-
tive-fuer-deutschland-party-1
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private, building a species of immunized community, a community of the ones 
that do not have communication, 4 where the possi-
bility of happiness never will be solved by contact or 
infection, but by a seeming flow that, driven by al-
gorithms, does not consider the individual; and this 
is not to overcome it in the name of the common – 
something that exists in the potential of every re-
ally pornographic gesture, which can only be done 
when it de-substantiates the real of the everyday 
sub-iectum –, but to return to old figures of subjec-
tivation that can only be theological-political. In this 
regard, here is my thesis:
III. Netflix is political theology 
Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, probably having in mind the paragraph 54 of 
La Societé du Spectacle by Guy Debord (Debord 1992), developed the concept 
of disjunctive synthesis, which indicates an apparatus that unites and divides at 
the same time, enabling a circular functioning in which both axes turn around 
themselves, dividing to unite and uniting to divide (Deleuze & Guattari 1972). 
The classic example is political representation that allows the unitary idea of 
“people”, denying, at the same time, the real people, and separating it from itself 
due to their representatives, as demonstrated by Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri 
(Hardt & Negri 2004, 241-242). However, the most recent and strongest exam-
ple of disjunctive synthesis is given by Roberto Esposito, another qualified read-
er of Deleuze. For him, the theological-political machine can be understood as an 
apparatus which, like the “person” category – the most mature and unsuspected 
fruit of the theological-political machine –, divides the reality in transcendence 
and immanence, making of one the secret basis of the other in a circular dialec-
tics that, as a game of chiaroscuro, does not only closes the access to the basis, 
but also keeps the living beings constantly in tension in inclusive-exclusive op-
erations (Esposito 2013).
This apparatus described by Esposito is intrinsically connected with the 
logic of exception demonstrated by Agamben through his series Homo Sacer. In 
this work, the exception, firstly understood as a certain apparatus which organ-
izes itself based on the poles zoé/bios, grows and indicates a general function – 
an accumulation of apparatus – that comprehend not only a particular case of bi-
opolitics, but also a totalizing structure called bipolar anthropological machine. 
This structure divides and creates an hierarchy into reality, bringing as the se-
cret basis of a practice or of an idea its opposite, as in the dyads anomia/nóm-
os, kingdom/glory, potency/act, animal/human, constituent power/constituted 
power, revolution/reformation, indicating, thus, an horizon of inability to over-
come the machine, which intends to work by itself, autotelically, already with-
out any significant contact with the living beings that continually are subjecti-
vated and desubjectivated under the sharp – but flexible – horizon of the capital 
(Agamben 2014). 
In this context, since these three main participants (Agamben, Negri 
and Esposito) do not dialogue among themselves, assuming the inescapable her-
itance of Deleuze in a very different way, the specific contribution of Esposito to 
this debate is to think the most terrible of the dyads, that is, transcendence and 
4 The recent tendency of “sponta-
neous sharing” of Netflix – when 
someone watches it through the 
cell phone or tablet of someone 
else in public places as buses, 
squares, lines, etc. without per-
mission, “sneezing” and spy-
ing – just confirms my argument, 
since, in situations like that, 38% 
of the people say that pretend 
that nothing is happening and 
keep watching, but 23% pause the 
show and 21% cover the screen. 
See: https://www.tecmundo.com.
br/cultura-geek/124132-nova-mo-
da-usuarios-assistindo-netf-
lix-publico-frequencia.htm
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immanence, poles that spinning over themselves in the emptiness, originate the 
theological-political machine of the West. For this purpose, Esposito resumes a 
potent reflection of the very last Deleuze, which, in postulating the immanence 
field, concludes that it cannot be understood as a space opposed to transcend-
ence. The ones that understood it in that way confused immanence with empir-
icism, failing to notice that the immanence performs the character perpetually 
unfinished of the real, its feature to contain itself and not to create an outside, 
in order to integrates itself by transcendence and immanence, at the same time 
(Deleuze 2003). 
In this sense, Hardt & Negri affirm that post-modernity – and the Empire 
that makes itself owner of it – is defined by the impossibility to be thought in 
terms of inside and outside (Hardt & Negri 2000). The immanence is absolute and 
happens – as the multitude and the Empire – inside borderless structures, being 
our task to transform it or, as proposed by Agamben, to profane it. Against this 
multitudinous tendency, the theological-political machine intends to establish 
once again the borders, the inside and the outside, the unsurpassed difference 
between transcendence and immanence, even if it operates beneath an excep-
tional or synthetically-disjunctive logic, problematically requiring the assump-
tion of the immanence field. 
Finally, what we propose is that Netflix – and everything it represents 
– is a special figure of the theological-political machine, and that is why it is en-
tangled in the very paradoxes of this apparatus, what, in an even more paradox-
ical way, empowers it. Recapitulating: the theological-political machine is para-
doxical because, working under the logic of the inclusive-exclusion in order to 
assert an inside and an outside, an immanent domain and a transcendent domain, 
has necessarily to do it under the background of immanence, that does not rec-
ognize inside and outside, since it operates under an ontological unlimited hori-
zon. This dual character of the theological-political machine is appropriated by 
an apparatus (Netflix) that, being itself also dual, it is able to assert and to im-
pose its duality everywhere it passes, thus, granting a presence which is perma-
nent and virtually absent. 
From this perspective, rise the difficulties of analyzing Netflix: the sub-
ject that it constitutes in collaboration with others subjects, but which uses its 
goods in the safety of home or notebook, is it a public or a private one? The 
Netflix reproduces or produces subjectivities? Is it adapted to the post-moderns 
dynamics of the non-sovereign flux and to the non-identity queer monstrosi-
ty or it just reaffirms localities and argots? – as seems to indicate its “nation-
al” TV Shows (examples: the Brazilian 3%, the Italian Suburra and the German 
Dark) and its “identity” TV Shows (Sense 8, Orange is The New Black, and so on), 
that are tailored not only for specific political communities, but also to groups 
that describe themselves as minorities. Does it free when it makes available only 
what can be used by the subject – no movies or TV Shows are property of the 
Netflix’s user or can be downloaded or appropriated – or does it reaffirm, in a 
even more strong way, the logic of property? – now restrict to the producers and 
owners of the movies and TV Shows that get in and get out of the catalog, artifi-
cially imposing to immaterial goods, characteristics of the XXI century, the log-
ic of property control, typical of the material goods from the classical econom-
ics based on scarcity. In this sense, regarding choice, can we consider that the 
availability of the menu, with pre-fixed options, even it is mutable, truly free the 
consumer, does it actually have a “right to choose”? – as in the elections of the 
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“democratic” nations, confirming, therefore, the logic of menu, present itself in all 
level of the capitalist biopolitical life (from videogames to supermarkets, from 
plastic surgery to haircuts), what Germán Huici demonstrated to be essential to 
the consolidation of the capitalism as a contemporary religion (Huici 2016).
The fact that these questions cannot be answered in a clear mode 
should not compromise the assertion that it is possible to make these questions. 
It is exactly in the impossibility to decide installed by them that rests the neces-
sary escape lines not only to a minor politics that rises from confused practices – 
although never unorganized –, but also to observe effective and concrete resist-
ances that make the disorder, the multiple and the entropy grow. Considering 
Netflix as an apparatus that points to transcendence – imposing on its users an 
impoverished experience of use that always takes the risk of turns itself in guilt 
or contemplation, indicating its own inexhaustibility in a expanding (its own 
movies and TV Shows) and mutant (movies and TV Shows from others) catalog 
that condemns us to the continuous privatization of the sight and of the choice –, 
it is urgent to introduce a careless use that knows not only to deactivate and let 
behind this intricate mesh, but also to give it new significations. 
In this regard, strategies that would come to profane this new politi-
cal theology could be represented as simple gestures, such as the public, open 
and random exhibition of TV Shows and movies from Netflix, in a systematic and 
interested political way, in schools, theaters, movie theaters, streets, squares, 
buildings, etc., passing through the offer of devices to open the access, what, in 
the limit, in the spirit of Tiziana Terranova ideas of free labour of collective minds 
in the Net (Terranova 2004, 73-97), could congregate endeavors to the creation 
of a Contraflix in the web, with the availability of the entire content of Netflix 
to the public, with no need to pay and with the additional possibility to create 
biddings between the users, that would be responsible for the continuous pro-
tection and the necessary nomadic reallocation of the platform, which, for ob-
vious reasons, would be target to uninterrupted legal, political and economical 
attempts of neutralization. This Contraflix would be fed by the users, and would 
not be limited to being only a copy of the Netflix. The users must redirect the ex-
pectations of the passive contemplation to a ground of common construction 
that, although similar to YouTube, would be in of a much higher quality, having 
no requirements of personal profiles, thus congregating with much more inten-
sity TV Shows and movies that became cult objects associated to Netflix and its 
characteristic “discommunicant” and private experience. 
Lastly, in the midst of the strategies of careless use, we must indicate 
the functions of papers such as the present one, that bring Netflix to the pages of 
a philosophy journal. It inarticulate the dyads responsible for ripping apart high 
culture and entertainment, criticism and enjoyment, reading and watching tele-
vision, indicating an urgent disorder of places, which becomes more radical due 
to the ontological and immanent mark that characterizes, in a very subtle and 
powerful way, desiring machines such as Netflix and ourselves
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